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This article explores the tension between idealized cosmopolitan ideas, of a single cit-
izenry for all people in the world, and imperial Roman nationalism between the late 
Roman Republic and the Italian Renaissance. In the form of three case studies (and 
without any claim that those are representative for the development) it focusses on 
three important thinkers whose work shows affinity with cosmopolitan discourse, but 
who at the same time also explicitly reflected on the political realities they were living 
in: Cicero, Augustine, and Lorenzo Valla. All three favour cosmopolitan ideals over 
political egoism, and all three reflect on whether and how the historical reign under 
which they are living can live up to the philosophical or theological ideals they advo-
cate. Finally, all three authors do not only share similar discursive patterns, but also 
react to each other intertextually (links will be mentioned especially between Cicero 
and Augustine and between Augustine and Valla). Thus, while all three are distinct 
in their argument and use cosmopolitan concepts for hugely different aims, the com-
parison can share light both on the boundaries and the discursive power of the concept 
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Modern theories of cosmopolitanism come in many jackets: they can focus on 
culture, language, economics, age or gender.1 Yet one of the uniting features is 
that the world is conceptualized as truly shared among all humans—an idea that 
ultimately rests on the assumption that all men are equal and should have the 
same rights, as they share the earth as their common homeland. As Nick Steven-
son formulates, “[t]he idea of cosmopolitanism joins together a notion of global 
citizenship as well as the capacity to live with the ‘Other’. Cosmopolitan critique 
is suspicious of dogmatism.”2 As a consequence, imperialism can be defined as one 
of its most distinct opposites, as the latter is directed towards inequality and the 
dominion of a minority at the costs of suppressing or even enslaving a majority of 
the people. From this perspective the imperium Romanum, one of the most con-
spicuous Empires of the ancient world, seems a curious object of cosmopolitan 
studies.3 Rome had subdued the Mediterranean and large parts of the known 
world; it had forced the inhabitants of the conquered regions to serve Rome’s 
armies, to pay taxes and to accept Roman state cults. It is simply impossible to 
deny that Rome controlled its Empire with force and military suppression; yet at 
the same time recent research has also shown that parts of its success was based 
on Rome’s tolerance towards local habits, cults and languages. The process of 
Romanization is no longer interpreted as a purely top-down process, but as dy-
namic. Inhabitants of the provinces adopted a Roman identity and at the same 
time kept their local one—a process that has been labelled ‘ancient globalization’ 
and has been described as the result of a profoundly interconnected world.4 From 
such a perspective, few historians would deny that the imperium Romanum had 
cosmopolitan characteristics. To mention just four: a high mobility of people 
within the Empire; the co-existence within the capital city of Rome of people 
with diverse cultural and territorial backgrounds (the same holds true for the Ro-
man army as a unifying factor of the Empire); international trade; and festival 
calendars that were synchronized all over the Mediterranean area.5 Nevertheless, 
one must not forget that such an ideal of harmonious globalization was not more 
than that: an ideal. Of course, Rome’s elite culture regularly prided itself on being 
an inclusive society.6 But the same upper class actively fuelled the suppressive 
 
1 See Cebolla Sanahuja, “The Right of the Subject,” 59. 
2 Stevenson, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship,” 244. 
3 See Cebolla Sanahuja, “The Right of the Subject,” 59–61, esp. 59: “and so, in ancient times, colonization 
and subjection defined the limits of the universal community of men. The kosmos [sic] polites, the citizen 
or the right of the subject that extends beyond the boundaries of the city or state, is in most cases deter-
mined or defined in relation to a previous state of war.” 
4 See Pitts and Versluys (eds.), Globalisation and the Roman World. In their introduction the editors write 
(p. 7): “Within Roman archaeology and history, we argue there is an urgent need to transcend post-
colonial approaches and a general concern with identity, and to engage more seriously with concepts of 
connectivity.” 
5 See, for example, Moatti, “Mobility and Identity,” 130–52; on mobility see Tacoma, Moving Romans; on 
festivals, see van Nijf, “Political Games,” 47–88. 
6 Sallust famously captures this ideology at the beginning of his Roman excursus at Conspiratio Catilinae 
6.2: “hi postquam in una moenia convenere, dispari genere, dissimili lingua, alii alio more viventes, in-
credibile memoratu est, quam facile coaluerint: ita brevi multitudo dispersa atque vaga concordia civitas 




nature of Rome’s imperial intentions, both by recurring to military achievements 
as a means of gaining esteem and political influence, and by exploiting the prov-
inces for personal enrichment.7 Cosmopolitan ideas, which will be at the core of 
this article, could be seen as one element of this Roman idealization and self-
fashioning, almost as a kind of ideological embellishment of a harsh imperialistic 
reality.8 
My article builds on this tension between idealized cosmopolitan ideas and 
outspoken imperialism. I will introduce three case studies that deal with three 
different eras (late Republican Rome, Late Antiquity and the Italian Renaissance). 
The three authors, Cicero, Augustine and Lorenzo Valla, have been chosen be-
cause, as I will argue, all three engage with the intriguing and intrinsic ambiguity 
between cosmopolitanism and imperialism: they favour cosmopolitan ideals over 
(political) egoism and reflect on how the historical system of their times can live 
up to the philosophical or theological ideals they advocate. A further reason why 
I have combined the three authors in one article is that their texts show how 
cosmopolitan discourse has always been open to recontextualizations and adapta-
tions to new conceptual frameworks. In this discursive process it is used more and 
more metaphorically in order to reflect on philosophical, theological and even 
linguistic matters. Cosmopolitanism thus can also be defined as a powerful tool 
for thinking, especially in debates that have a strong utopian element in them. In 
my three case studies I argue that the authors not only share similar discursive 
patterns, but also react to each other via marked intertextual links. 
I start with Cicero, whose philosophical treatises seem to have imported 
Greek cosmopolitan ideas into Latin discourse. He makes use of cosmopolitan 
ideas as a means to develop his highly idealized alternative draft for Rome’s polit-
ical crisis in the 50s and 40s BCE. The second case study is dedicated to Augustine, 
a fervent imitator and at the same time critic of Cicero’s philosophy. I contend 
that he also recurs to elements of cosmopolitan terminology in order to advocate 
his idealized counterpart to the political realities of the beginning of the fifth cen-
tury CE: that is, citizenship in the reign of God. Augustine thereby applies Cicero’s 
philosophical and political cosmopolitanism to theology. The third case study will 
be dedicated to Lorenzo Valla, who recurred to both Cicero and Augustine when 
drafting his utopia of a linguistic permanence of Roman cosmopolitanism: the 
Latin language in his view was the heir of the imperium Romanum in that it had 
to be the language of the whole world. While all three thinkers are distinct in 
 
facta erat” (“After these two peoples, different in race, unlike in speech and living according to different 
customs, came together within the same walls, it is unbelievable to relate how easily they merged, so 
quickly did harmony change a heterogeneous and roving throng into a body of citizens.” (Translation: J. 
C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library 116, Cambridge, MA: 2013).  
7 The tension between cosmopolitan ideal and imperialistic reality in Roman literature has already been 
highlighted more than 100 years ago in a seminal study on Roman exemplarity by Litchfield, “National 
exempla virtutis,” 11–13. In accordance with the world in which he lived (1914 was a time in which na-
tionalism and patriotism were very powerful in many countries of the world), his interpretation of the 
moral hierarchies in Rome depicts cosmopolitanism as a threat to the highest value of patriotism; see ibid. 
13: “Yet amid polemic and detraction, amid material corruption and disaster, for centuries the ancient cult 
of patriotism subsisted.” 
8 I owe this formulation to the insightful remark of an anonymous peer reviewer. 




their argument and use cosmopolitan concepts in different discursive contexts 
(philosophy, theology and linguistics), they share at least one element: the rootage 
of their debates in Rome and its Empire, which offers them the historical and 
political foil for their argumentation. I hope that this comparative approach will 
shed light on the discursive power of the concept in the long history of Latin 
literature from Antiquity to the Renaissance, while not glossing over its bounda-
ries that it reaches when being applied to these hugely diverse fields. 
2 Cicero’s struggle with Stoic cosmopolitanism 
Cicero might not seem an obvious candidate to begin a contribution about cos-
mopolitanism. As a politician he was attached to the city of Rome and not very 
keen on being absent from it for reasons other than periods of study in one of his 
villas. His notorious unwillingness to leave Rome for the provinces is best cap-
tured in the famous anecdote he himself has transmitted in his speech Pro Plancio. 
When returning from his quaestorship in the Sicilian city of Lilybaeum, Cicero 
imagined that Rome wouldn’t talk about anything else than his excellent conduct 
of the office. But nothing was less true: he met a man who asked him what news 
he was bringing from Rome, and when he indignantly answered that he had re-
turned from his service in the province, the passer-by first said: “O right, in Africa, 
wasn’t it?” After Cicero’s even more irritated answer that he had been in Sicily, 
another interlocutor reproached the first one by saying “But didn’t you know that 
he had been in Syracuse?”9 In other words: not even the man who pretends to be 
reasonably well informed and to know that Cicero was in Sicily gets the exact city 
of his quaestorship right. The charmingly self-ironic anecdote is introduced with 
a sentence that seems to summarize Cicero’s attitude towards cosmopolitanism 
quite nicely: “sed ita multa Romae geruntur ut vix ea quae fiunt in provinciis 
audiantur.”10 In other words: most Romans do not have any interest in affairs that 
happen outside their own urban environment; therefore, an ambitious young pol-
itician should not leave the city for too long. 
Yet the decisions that Cicero made in his life as a politician are a different 
matter to what he discusses in his philosophical writings. In these he regularly 
invokes the notion of the world as a shared fatherland of all human beings,11 
which he mostly borrowed from the Stoics. As far as we know, the first Greek to 
coin the term κοσμοπολίτης was the cynic Diogenes, but his cosmopolitanism was 
rather individualistic and dissociative, as Anna Busetto, based on the arguments 
 
9 Cicero, Pro Plancio 65: “itaque hac spe decedebam ut mihi populum Romanum ultro omnia delaturum 
putarem. at ego cum casu diebus eis itineris faciendi causa decedens e provincia Puteolos forte venissem, 
cum plurimi et lautissimi in eis locis solent esse, concidi paene, iudices, cum ex me quidam quaesisset quo 
die Roma exissem et num quidnam esset novi. cui cum respondissem me e provincia decedere: ‘etiam me 
hercule,’ inquit, ‘ut opinor, ex Africa.’ huic ego iam stomachans fastidiose: ‘immo ex Sicilia,’ inquam. tum 
quidam, quasi qui omnia sciret: ‘quid? tu nescis,’ inquit, ‘hunc quaestorem Syracusis fuisse?’”  
10 Cicero, Pro Plancio 63: “But in the bustle of life at Rome it is almost impossible to attend to what goes 
on in the provinces.” (Translation: N.H. Watts, Loeb Classical Library 158, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1923). 
11 Cicero is also one of the few Roman authors whom one regularly finds in indexes of modern companions 
to cosmopolitan studies, as for example in Delanty, ed., Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan 
Studies. 




by John Moles, has shown.12 It was the Stoics and above all Chrysippus who con-
nected cosmopolitanism with the idea of a world citizenship based on a shared 
ὀρθὸς λόγος of all human beings.13 They thereby redefined the concept as a social 
obligation and the fundament for their idea that a wise man should not withhold 
from the duties imposed on him by his country. Cicero, for whom philosophy and 
politics formed a close unity throughout his life,14 was obviously attracted by this 
concept and regularly includes it in his philosophical dialogues.15 
Malcolm Schofield has collected and discussed the most important passages 
of Cicero’s philosophical works that deal with the Stoic notion of cosmopolitan-
ism: De re publica 1.19, De legibus 1.23, De finibus 3.64, and De natura deorum 
2.154. Based on the premise that gods and men are equally obliged to obey the 
natural law, all passages assert that the world is the homeland of gods and men 
alike (for example, De legibus 1.23: “ut iam universus <sit> hic mundus una civitas 
communis deorum atque hominum”).16 This divine gift to all men implies the 
consequence that all human beings are equal (De re publica 1.19: “sed mundus hic 
totus, quod domicilium quamque patriam di nobis communem secum dederunt”)17 
and that they have an elevated status in the hierarchy of nature: everything within 
the world is created so that it serves for the human beings’ usufruct (De natura 
deorum 2.154: “principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, 
quaeque in eo sunt, ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa sunt”).18 The com-
mon ground on which this shared patria of men and gods is built is their shared 
ratio (the Stoic λόγος), which enables them to live together under a legal system 
and according to commonly accepted laws (ius and leges): “est enim mundus quasi 
communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione 
utentes iure ac lege vivunt (De natura deorum 2.154).”19 Of course we must bear in 
 
12 Busetto, “The Idea of Cosmopolitanism,” 302–17; Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 105–20. 
13  See, for example, Chrysippus fr. 337 (in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, volume 3): “τὸν δὲ ἀρχηγέτην ἐκεῖνον 
οὐ μόνον πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνον κοσμοπολίτην λέγοντες ἀψευδέστατα ἐροῦμεν. ἦν γὰρ οἶκος αὐτῷ 
καὶ πόλις ὁ κόσμος” (“If we call this first founder not only the first man, but almost a cosmopolitan, then 
we will speak very true things. For his house and his state was the kosmos”). See Schofield, The Stoic Idea, 
chapter 3, and Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City, especially chapter 2. 
14  See, for example, Cicero, De divinatione 2.6–7 with Zarecki, Cicero’s Ideal Statesman, esp. 136, and Butler, 
The Hand of Cicero, 110–11. 
15  See Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” 105–46. My summary is much indebted to his analysis. 
16 “Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men 
are members.” (Translation: C.W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928). See 
Girardet, Die Ordnung der Welt, 135–38 and 145–50. Similarly, De finibus 3.64. 
17 “But [it] is the whole universe, a home and a fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of 
sharing with them.” (Translation: C.W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928). 
18 “In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains 
were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men.” (Translation: H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 
268, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1933). Like the ThLL, I understand fructus here in its legal technical meaning 
(~usus fructus), see ThLL s.v. I A. 
19 “For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; 
for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law.” (Translation: H. Rackham, Loeb 
Classical Library 268, Cambridge, MA: Loeb 1933). Similarly, De legibus 1.23: “prima homini cum deo 
rationis societas. inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: quae cum sit lex, lege 
quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus” (“The first common possession of man and God is reason. 
But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is 
Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods.” Translation: C.W. Keyes, Loeb 




mind that the passages are uttered by different speakers in different dialogues; but 
as one of them is Cicero’s own literary persona (De legibus) and the two others are 
politicians he deeply admired (Scipio Aemilianus in De re publica and Cato Uti-
censis, whose encomium Cicero had written almost contemporarily,20 in De fini-
bus), I do not see any reason why we should not interpret the passages as proof of 
a genuine interest of Cicero in the concept. Taken together, they express an ide-
alistic view of men’s social competence: if all humans are equal, share the same 
laws and consider themselves compatriots of the same universal state, nature will 
also compel all to behave altruistically rather than to follow their personal desires. 
In this view, human beings are first and foremost seen as political animals that 
care for the well-being of the community rather than for their personal advantage: 
“ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut 
enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens 
et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius 
alicuius aut suae consulit.”21 
There is another important aspect of Cicero’s cosmopolitan theory that is 
worth mentioning here, for it concerns the relationship between a cosmopolitan 
and a Rome-centred view of the world.22 As Malcolm Schofield has put it, “[t]he 
cosmic city can be seen … as a concept which mediates the transition from repub-
licanism to natural law theory.” As citizenship is no longer based on “physical 
proximity or mutual acquaintance,”23 the concept is potentially very attractive for 
the world order that had gradually emerged since the fourth century BCE with the 
Empire of Alexander the Great, through which huge parts of the known world 
had become parts of one political entity under Greek dominion. When in the 
third and especially the second centuries BCE the Romans in turn conquered in-
creasingly more regions of the Hellenistic world, they also inherited the fascina-
tion for the Stoic concept. Schofield argues that especially after the Italic wars, 
when the inhabitants of Italy had received Roman citizenship, the definition of 
citizens as persons who live within the same city walls was no longer valid and 
needed to be adapted to the universal needs of the Empire.24 
It is obvious that the idealized image does not correspond to the realities 
Cicero encountered in his life. On the one hand, the contradiction lies within his 
own character. As already mentioned, he often was not able to see the whole world 
as his fatherland, but wanted to stay in Rome at all costs. His depressed letters 
during his exile of 58/57 BCE are the most telling example for this and contrast 
 
Classical Library 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb 1928). See Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” 109; Dyck, A 
Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus, 125 on recta ratio as “attribute of the gods and the Stoic sage.” One 
might relate this to the famous definition of the populus in De re publica 1.39: populus is not every coetus 
multitudinis, but a coetus iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. 
20 On Cicero’s Cato, see Kierdorf, “Ciceros Cato,” 167–84.  
21 Cicero, De finibus 3.64: “… from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common 
advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, 
wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that 
of himself or of any single individual.” (Translation: H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 40, Cambridge, 
MA: Loeb, 1914). 
22 See Márquez, “Between urbs and orbis,” 181–211. 
23 Schofield, The Stoic Idea, 103. 
24 Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” 110–11. 




starkly with the philosophical ideal. This becomes obvious in a passage from the 
Tusculanae Disputationes, where he recommends embracing the Pacuvian verse 
that “patria est, ubicumque est bene” and praises the second-century politician 
(and Epicurean!) Titus Albucius for having borne his exile in an exemplary man-
ner—he used the time to continue his philosophical studies in Athens—with 
utmost tranquillity: “itaque ad omnem rationem Teucri vox accommodari potest: 
‘Patria est, ubicumque est bene’ [Pacuvius, Teucer]. Socrates quidem cum rogare-
tur, civitatem se esse diceret, ‘mundanum’ inquit [see Plutarch, De exilio = Moralia 
600]; totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. Quid? T. Albucius 
nonne animo aequissimo Athenis exul philosophabatur?”25 During his own exile 
Cicero did nothing similar. His unphilosophical behaviour was a reason for count-
less attacks on his stableness (constantia) ever since antiquity—one has only to 
think of Cassius Dio’s treatment in which a philosopher called Philiscus consoles 
Cicero and encourages him to stop “weeping like a woman” (38.18.1),26 or of Pet-
rarch’s famous letter addressed to Cicero in Book 24 of his Epistulae familiares.27  
The second and more substantial reason for the discrepancy between philo-
sophical ideal and reality is the time in which Cicero was living. It is well known 
that all the philosophical treatises mentioned above were composed in periods of 
his life when he was excluded from active politics (in the late 50s after his return 
from exile during the first triumvirate, and in 45/44 under Caesar’s dictatorship) 
and fell victim to the egoistic behaviour of the major political players of the time. 
Cosmopolitanism therefore might have seemed attractive to Cicero not because 
he cared so much for all people in the whole world, but because he could present 
it as a political alternative in which the idea of unanimity and equality would also 
be embraced by the political agents in Rome.28 His reflections are nurtured by the 
 
25 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 5.108: “And so Teucer’s saying can be fitted to every condition: ‘One’s 
country is wherever one does well.’ Socrates, for instance, on being asked to what country he claimed to 
belong, said, ‘To the world’; for he regarded himself as a native and citizen of the whole world. What of 
T. Albucius? Did he not study philosophy at Athens with complete tranquillity in exile?” (Translation: 
J.E. King, Loeb Classical Library 141, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1927). See Woolf, Cicero, 246 (on the prob-
lematic lack of political engagement during exile). 
26 See Gowing, “Greek Advice,” 359–72, and Jansen, “Cicero, toon karakter!” 161–66. Similarly, Plutarch 
criticizes Cicero’s behaviour in exile as unworthy for a man of his erudition, who considered himself to be 
a philosopher, see Plutarch, Life of Cicero 32.4–5: “πολλῶν δὲ φοιτώντων ἀνδρῶν ὑπ᾿ εὐνοίας καὶ τῶν 
Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων διαμιλλωμένων πρὸς αὑτὰς ταῖς πρεσβείαις, ὅμως ἀθυμῶν καὶ περίλυπος διῆγε τὰ πολλά, 
πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες, ἀφορῶν, καὶ τῷ φρονήματι μικρὸς ἄγαν καὶ ταπεινὸς ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς 
γεγονὼς καὶ συνεσταλμένος, ὡς οὐκ ἄν τις ἄνδρα παιδείᾳ συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτῃ προσεδόκησε. καίτοι πολλάκις 
αὐτὸς ἠξίου τοὺς φίλους μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον” (“But although many people visited him 
out of goodwill, and the Greek cities vied with one another in sending him deputations, still, he passed 
his time for the most part in dejection and great grief, looking off towards Italy like a disconsolate lover, 
while in his spirit he became very petty and mean by reason of his misfortune, and was more humbled 
than one would have expected in a man who had enjoyed so lofty a discipline as his. And yet he often 
asked his friends not to call him an orator, but a philosopher.” Translation: B. Perrin, Loeb Classical 
Library 99, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1919). 
27 On this famous letter, see recently McLaughlin, “Petrarch and Cicero,” 26–30 (with further literature); an 
intriguing interpretation is offered by Enenkel, “Heilige Cicero, help mij!,” 19–27. 
28 See Girardet, Die Ordnung der Welt, 137 on the “Wechselwirkung von theologischer Spekulation und 
politischer Situation” (with regard to Cicero, De legibus 1.23), and Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” passim. 
Similarly, see Stevenson, “Reverberations of Empire,” 184–85, and, ground-breaking, Griffin, “Iure plecti-
mur,” 85–111. See the overview by Eckstein, “Conceptualizing,” 568–89. 




increasingly disruptive competition among mighty generals like Pompey and Cae-
sar for whom warfare was only a means to increase their own influence (and who 
in their overambitious emulation did not even shrink back from forcing Rome 
into a civil war). Cicero therefore constructs a dichotomy between a still reasona-
bly good past, in which the Romans were patrons, but not rulers of the world 
(“illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari”),29 and 
the harsh present, in which the Romans degenerated so much that they have 
almost lost their res publica, if one defines it as a state based on shared values, laws 
and rationality (“itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam ex-
trema scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus”).30  
This quotation again shows how closely Cicero connects the Roman city-
state (the nucleus of Rome’s existence) and its dominion over the world (the cos-
mopolitan view of Rome’s role in the world): “the corruption of imperial rule 
abroad inevitably undermines the res publica at home.”31 The same can also be 
deduced from the passage in De finibus quoted above.32 The explanation of Cato, 
the main representative of Stoic thought in this dialogue, starts with an idealistic 
assumption that everyone is part of the same world that unites gods and men: 
“unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem.” But obviously even Cicero’s 
spokesman Cato was not able to feel the interests of all inhabitants of distant lands 
in a similar way. The next argumentative step therefore returns to the term res 
publica: a proditor patriae must be punished, whereas someone who dies for the 
res publica deserves praise, “because it is fitting that the fatherland is dearer to us 
than our own life” (“quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ip-
sos”). The terminology will automatically invite Roman readers to think of Cic-
ero’s engagement for his own state, the res publica Romana. This neatly fits the 
argument of Book 1 of De legibus, where the global Stoic citizenship and the ac-
ceptance of the same natural laws for everyone had led men to form the first local 
 
29 Cicero, De officiis 2.27: “… our government could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world 
than a dominion.” (Translation: W. Miller, Loeb Classical Library 30, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1913). 
30 Cicero, De officiis 2.29: “And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing—and even they 
wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes—but our republic we have lost for ever.” (Translation: 
W. Miller, Loeb Classical Library 30, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1913). See Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, 
De Officiis, 407 on the discourse of moral decline that led to the loss of the Republic in Roman theory. 
31 Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” 135; the De officiis-passage being referred to on p. 29. 
32 Cicero, De finibus 3.64: [Cato:] “mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi com-
munem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex 
quo illud natura consequi ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem 
singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis offici non ignarus utilitati 
omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam 
communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit 
qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos.” (“Again, 
they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are 
members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we 
should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety 
of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the ad-
vantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not 
deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of 
his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, 
because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves.” Translation: H. Rackham, Loeb Classical 
Library 40, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1914). 




citizenries. This shows Cicero’s Roman interpretation of the Stoic concept: Rome 
and its Empire appear as a kind of factual representation of the cosmic city, yet as 
one that threatens to lose its moral roots; therefore the cosmopolitan ideal is 
invoked as a corrective of contemporary misbehaviour.33 This concentration on 
Rome as the centre of a cosmopolitan Empire partly mitigates the contradiction 
between the cosmopolitan ideas uttered in Cicero’s dialogues and his fixation on 
the city of Rome in his political career. 
3 Augustine’s city of God as a cosmopolitan state? 
The tension between a supranational, all-encompassing civitas mundi and the Ro-
man Empire, which we have seen in Cicero, continued to interest authors of later 
periods—especially the relation of the abstract concept of a cosmic city and the 
Roman Empire as its concrete representation was negotiated. As Johannes van 
Oort has shown, imperial Stoic thinkers often stressed the dichotomy between 
the earthly and the cosmic city.34 Epictetus for example, in a synthesis of Stoic 
and Platonic ideas, interprets the earthly polis as a shadowy image of the cosmic 
one;35 when Seneca in De otio speaks about the two res publicae, the civitas mundi 
is defined as res vere publica.36 But even if many authors construct a strong oppo-
sition between the two civitates, they thereby subscribe to the idea that the only 
visible transnational political entity of their time is Rome. As in Cicero, Rome’s 
name is associated with an (albeit imperfect, non-philosophical) version of cos-
mopolitan citizenry. Aelius Aristides expresses this very concisely in his praise of 
Rome (Encomium Romae 63 = Orationes 14.214 Dindorf). According to him, τὸ 
Ῥωμαῖον is no name of a concrete state, but the name of a sort (γένος) that is 
common to all (“καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαῖον εἶναι ἐποιήσατε οὐ πόλεως, ἀλλὰ γένους ὄνομα 
κοινοῦ τινος”). According to Daniel Richter, Aristides reflects Rome’s status as a 
polis composed of many poleis, a “post-local” entity transforming a concrete impe-
rialistic Roman presence in the provinces into a kind of a-political Roman-ness.37  
 
33 See Schofield, “Cosmopolitanism,” 124: “What really interests him is still the civitas and res publica of On 
the Commonwealth, with Rome and its laws and historic customs taken as the paradigm of the best con-
stitution”; see also Girardet, Die Ordnung der Welt, 148–50 on Cicero’s wish for a newly constituted Ro-
man Empire based on the legislation he proposes (which Girardet calls the codex Ciceronianus). 
34 See van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon, 250. 
35 Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.26: “τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, 
μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα.” (“For what is a man? A part of 
a state; first of that state which is made up of gods and men, and then of that which is said to be very 
close to the other, the state that is a small copy of the universal state.” Translation: W.A. Oldfather, Loeb 
Classical Library 131, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1925). 
36 See Seneca, De otio = Dialogi 8.4.1: “duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere 
publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed 
terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi.” (“Let us grasp 
the idea that there are two commonwealths—the one, a vast and truly common state, which embraces 
alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner of earth nor to that, but measure the bounds 
of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident 
of birth.” Translation: J.W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library 254, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1932); see 
Schofield, The Stoic Idea, 93. 
37 Richter, Cosmopolis, 4. 




In the following, I will briefly discuss Augustine’s De civitate dei, in which 
ethico-political cosmopolitanism is redefined within a religious discourse. The 
starting point, however, is still the political entity of Rome’s Empire. When Au-
gustine wrote his De civitate dei, Rome’s cultural and political identity was very 
much at stake. Already since the fourth century, the rise of Christianity had ques-
tioned the cultural canon of the Roman elite in a radical way (suffice to think of 
the famous debates about whether it was acceptable for a Christian to read pagan 
authors like Vergil or Seneca). In this debate, Augustine was one of the most 
influential Christian authorities to defend the adaptation of classical culture. Cic-
ero was especially dear to him. It is well established that Cicero’s writings pro-
foundly influenced him in almost all phases of his life and that he very regularly 
referred to or quoted this late-Republican model.38 This veneration was not re-
stricted to Cicero’s rhetorical abilities, but also encompasses his philosophical ac-
umen—the role of the Hortensius as a first step towards Christianity in the Con-
fessiones is perhaps the most famous example. Especially for Platonic and Stoic 
concepts, Cicero seems to have been Augustine’s “most important intermediary:”39 
This is especially true for his De civitate dei, in which quotations from Cicero’s 
philosophical oeuvre abound and where Cicero is “unus e numero doctissimorum 
hominum idemque eloquentissimus omnium.”40  
At the same time, Augustine’s treatise questions the political legitimation of 
the eternal imperium Romanum.41 Written as a reaction to the Gothic sack of 
Rome of 410 CE and the resulting “ideological uncertainty” among the Romans, 
Augustine has to defend the Christian god from accusations that he has proven 
to be a less powerful protector of the city and the Empire than the pagan gods 
had been before.42 Gerard O’Daly has linked Augustine’s work, composed in a 
moment of political crisis, to Cicero’s philosophical works (and especially his De 
re publica), which were written in similarly unstable periods.43 For both authors, 
the Stoic ideal of a cosmic city based on moral perfection functioned as a corrective 
of the present political turmoil, which lay bare the imperfections of the present 
political realities. But while for Cicero the Roman res publica in principle resem-
bled the cosmopolitan ideal in that it was based on the same idea of equality of 
men, for Augustine the Roman state was profoundly imperfect in its foundation. 
For him, it therefore was no representative, but only a contrasting foil for his 
conception of an ideal cosmic state.44 
Of course, Augustine was not the first Christian author to reply to the Stoic 
concept of cosmopolitanism in this way. Already in the later second and earlier 
 
38 See the classical study by Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron, especially volume 2. See also the recent over-
view of Taylor, “Augustine’s Reception of Cicero,” 17–34. According to him Cicero “functions as a kind 
of metaphysical anchor” for Augustine’s thoughts, at 25. 
39 Van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon, 242. 
40 Augustine, De civitate dei 22.6: “one of a number of very learned men and himself the most eloquent of 
all men” (Translation: W.M. Green, Loeb Classical Library 417, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1972). 
41 See Baier, “Cicero und Augustinus,” 121–40. 
42 See the concise overview in O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 27–33 (quotation on p. 28). 
43 See O’Daly, “Thinking through History,” 49. 
44 This idea of two opposing states (a good and a bad one) was less based on Stoic thought, but influenced 
by Manichean and Jewish sources, as van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon, has shown at length. 




third centuries CE we find references. Tertullian in his Apologeticus writes that 
Christians recognize only one state (res publica) for all people, namely the world, 
and thereby renounce all earthly glory and all ardent engagement in the worldly 
politics as the ordinary states, alien to Christians (“at enim nobis ab omni gloriae 
et dignitatis ardore frigentibus nulla est necessitas coetus nec ulla magis res aliena 
quam publica. unam omnium rem publicam agnoscimus, mundum”).45 Similarly, 
Clement of Alexandria in his Stromata explicitly refers to the Stoics when assert-
ing that heaven is a proper city, whereas places on earth are not because a real city 
must be morally good (“λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν, 
τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πόλεις· ἔγεσθαι μὲν γάρ, οὐκ εἶναι δέ· σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ 
πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἀστεῖόν τι σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον”).46 
We find a similar dichotomy in Augustine’s De civitate dei as well. The 
adapted cosmopolitan approach to the civitas terrena becomes evident when Au-
gustine explicitly refutes Cicero’s famous definition of a res publica as the res populi 
(“est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis 
hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris con-
sensu et utilitatis communione sociatus”).47 He turns the definition against Cicero 
and against the political realities of his time by declaring that the Roman state 
never was a state because it never belonged to the people (“numquam fuit Romana 
res publica quia numquam fuit res populi”).48 The reason for this is the lack of 
iustitia, which Cicero (with the formulation iuris consensus) had defined as the 
conditio sine qua non for any citizenry. As, however, most inhabitants of the Em-
pire have never agreed to live under Roman jurisdiction, the Roman state cannot 
be considered legal.49 Augustine hereby substitutes Cicero’s ius (or more precisely: 
the public consent about the law) with iustitia: instead of Cicero’s legal and polit-
ical terminology, which defines the relationship of men among each other, he 
 
45 Tertullian, Apologeticus 38.3: “We, however, whom all the flames of glory and dignity leave cold, have no 
need to combine; nothing is more foreign to us than the State. One state we know, of which all are 
citizens—the universe” (my translation). 
46 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 4.26: “The Stoics say that the universe is in the proper sense a city, but 
that those here on earth are not—they are called cities, but are not really. For a city or a people is some-
thing morally good, an organization or group of men administered by law which exhibits refinement.” 
(Translation: Schofield, The Stoic Idea, 61). 
47 Cicero, De re publica 1.39: “Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not 
any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large 
numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.” 
(Translation: C.W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library 213, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1928). 
48 Augustine, De civitate dei 19.21: “There never was a Roman state, for there never was a people’s estate.” 
(Translation: W.C. Greene, Loeb Classical Library 416, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1960). See Adams, The 
Populus of Augustine and Jerome, 17–22. Smolak, “Res publica res populi Dei,” 109–39, comments on p. 113: 
“Die Definition Ciceros wird also grundsätzlich für zulässig erachtet—allein ihre Anwendung auf die res 
publica Romana für nicht zutreffend.” Similarly Taylor, “Augustine’s Reception of Cicero,” 26. It is note-
worthy that Augustine does not mention Cicero’s critical stance on his own time in De officiis 2.29, in 
which the loss of Rome’s moral compass has almost led to a loss of the state, see above (with n. 30). 
49 On this famous passage in Augustine, see, for example, Treloar, “Cicero and Augustine,” 571–77; Smolak, 
“Res publica res populi Dei,” passim; and Baier, “Cicero und Augustinus,” 137–38. 




speaks about justice between God and men.50 Still, the consequences of Augus-
tine’s provocative claim for his contemporary readers are considerable: he under-
mines the political legitimacy of half a millennium of Rome’s imperial reign in 
the Mediterranean world, yet he does so with a terminology that Roman readers 
knew from classical political theory. This ambiguity has led to diverse interpreta-
tions of Augustine’s take on the earthly Empire. According to Ada Neschke, De 
civitate dei is meant to undermine the belief of Rome that it is an imitation 
(mimēsis) of a philosophical ideal.51 Gerard O’Daly argues in the opposite direction 
and stresses that Augustine “gives an account of how Christians may, and why 
they must, be good citizens of the Empire, by defining the limited but significant 
area where the aims and interests of the two cities, in their historical form, coin-
cide.”52  
My contribution will not attempt to solve this riddle. Instead, I will briefly 
turn to how Augustine describes the earthly and celestial cities. Johannes van Oort 
has argued that Augustine’s choice to label God’s reign as a civitas suggests that 
he is not referring to a single political state, but rather to the equivalent of the 
Greek πόλις, that is, a community based on “its own politics, legal standards, eth-
ics, economics and, last but not least, its own religion.”53 In other words, it is very 
close to Cicero’s legal definition of his ideal cosmic city, and by consequence also 
resembles his ideal (Roman) res publica. This means that in contrasting God’s 
rightful civitas with the unrightful earthly civitas, Augustine, following earlier 
Christian thinkers, has not only created one cosmic city as the Stoics did, but two: 
one deficient and earthly (the Empire of Rome which dominates the world 
through injustice and force) and one perfect and heavenly.54 Both are cosmopoli-
tan in that they are transnational, all-encompassing entities. What is more: both 
are places where Christians live.55 God’s city is their final destination, whereas 
worldly citizenship is temporary, but still common to all, as a passage from De 
opere monachorum testifies, where Augustine explains that it does not matter to 
which monastery one gives one’s alms and charities, because “for all Christians 
there is one res publica” (“omnium enim christianorum una res publica est”).56 
Admittedly, De opere monachorum is quite another text than De civitate dei, 
but also in the latter we find similar references. In Book 5, Augustine declares 
that Christians can live well and without harming their souls under whatever 
 
50 See Neschke, “La cité n’est pas à nous,” 236–37; Smolak, “Res publica res populi Dei,” 115–20. Smolak also 
mentions (p. 120) that Augustine inherited the redefinition of iustitia as transcendent Christian justice 
from Lactantius.  
51 Neschke, “La cité n’est pas à nous,” 240: “Par conséquent, et à différence du platonisme politique, jamais 
la cité terrestre, même en tant que cité temporelle, peut être une μίμησις de la cité céleste ou spirituelle”. 
52 O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 209. 
53 Van Oort, “Civitas dei—terrena civitas,” 161. 
54 Or even three, if we consider the (imperfect) church in Augustine’s time as another earthly entity spanning 
the whole world. See O’Daly, “Thinking through History,” 57: “The church is not presented in Augustine 
as the equivalent of a political society. Yet it shares some of the undesirable characteristics of secular 
institutions.” 
55 See Taylor, “Augustine’s Reception of Cicero,” 28: “These cities are ‘interwoven’ and ‘mingled’ in everyday 
life, and we participate in each according to that love that motivates us—we dwell in the earthly city as we 
act on our self-love, and we participate in the Holy City when we are moved by our love for God.” 
56 Augustine, De opere monachorum 33. 




earthly dominion, as long as the rulers don’t force them to do injustice (“quantum 
enim pertinet ad hanc uitam mortalium, quae paucis diebus ducitur et finitur, 
quid interest sub cuius imperio uiuat homo moriturus, si illi qui imperant ad impia 
et iniqua non cogant?”).57 For the time being, the earthly reign in which the 
Christians live is the Roman one, the second all-encompassing cosmopolitan em-
pire in the history of mankind.58 This means that the terrena civitas in Augustine’s 
time is equivalent to the res publica Romana: when reflecting on Romulus and his 
murder of Remus, he introduces the section with the sentence “the first founder 
of the earthly state (‘terrenae civitatis conditor’) thus was a fratricide.”59 Whereas 
Augustine has refuted Cicero with Cicero’s own definition when denying the ex-
istence of the Roman Empire as a legal entity, in other passages Cicero’s shifting 
from civitas mundi to (Roman) state (which we have seen in the De finibus-pas-
sage) is taken up by Augustine. In order to be able to do so, he proposes a weaker, 
non-ethical definition: a state is a “coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas dili-
git concordi communione sociatus.”60 According to James O’Donnell, the sen-
tence reveals Augustine’s attitude towards Cicero as follows: “Cicero and his tra-
dition are not rejected, refuted, denied—they are, in the best sense, 
transcended.”61 However, Kurt Smolak has argued—convincingly in my view—
that the pragmatic and at first seemingly neutral definition has negative associa-
tions: first, the lacuna of any legal element in the definition makes the state 
 
57 Augustine, De civitate dei 5.17: “As far as this mortal life is concerned, which is passed and ended in a few 
days, what difference does it make for a man who is soon to die, under what ruler he lives, if only the 
rulers do not force him to commit unholy and unjust deeds?” (Translation: W.M. Green, Loeb Classical 
Library 412, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1963). 
58 Augustine, De civitate dei 18.2: “sed inter plurima regna terrarum, in quae terrenae utilitatis vel cupiditatis 
est divisa societas—quam civitatem mundi huius universali vocabulo nuncupamus—duo regna cernimus 
longe ceteris provenisse clariora, Assyriorum primum, deinde Romanorum, ut temporibus, ita locis inter 
se ordinata atque distincta. nam quo modo illud prius, hoc posterius: eo modo illud in Oriente, hoc in 
Occidente surrexit; denique in illius fine huius initium confestim fuit. regna cetera ceterosque reges velut 
adpendices istorum dixerim.” (“But among the numerous kingdoms of the world, into which the society 
motivated by worldly advantage or satisfaction, which we call by the general name the ‘city of this world’, 
has been divided, we note that two powers have gained far greater fame than the rest, first that of the 
Assyrians, and later that of the Romans, as neatly arranged and well spaced from each other in time as in 
place. For just as the one arose earlier and the other later, so also the one arose in the east and the other 
in the west, and, to conclude, the beginning of the one followed immediately upon the end of the other. 
All other kingdoms and kings I should describe as appendages of these empires.” Translation: E.M. San-
ford and W.M. Green, Loeb Classical Library 415, Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1965). 
59 Augustine, De civitate dei 15.5. 
60 Augustine, De civitate dei 19.24: “A people is a large gathering of rational beings united in fellowship by 
their agreement about the objects of their love.” (Translation: W.C. Greene, Loeb Classical Library 416, 
Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1960). On the replacement of consensus iuris with concors communio and possible 
(almost ironic) implications see Kempshall, “De re publica in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought,” 
99–135, here 102–3; on p. 105, he summarizes Augustine’s definition as “nothing other than a multitude 
of humans tied together by some bond of association” (with reference to Augustine, De civitate dei 15.8). 
Contra, Taylor, “Augustine’s Reception of Cicero,” 30, believes that Augustine with this formulation tries 
to connect his concept of the earthly civitas closely with Cicero’s in De re publica, in that both need a 
skilled and moral statesman in order “to discipline and bend his fellow citizens toward divine truth.” 
61 O’Donnell, “Augustine—Cicero redivivus,” 110. According to O’Donnell, Augustine is in constant dia-
logue with Cicero in “thinking about communities of people as communities, taking questions of polity 
and politics back to fundamentals.” On p. 111, he even tentatively compares the structural imitation of 
Cicero in De civitate dei with Macrobius’ Saturnalia. 




susceptible to arbitrariness; second, it connects it to two empires of the Old Tes-
tament, Egypt and Assyria, which always acted as unlawful opponents of Israel.62 
Taking these elements into account, one could say that Augustine defines the 
imperium Romanum as part of God’s creation and as a necessary step in the history 
of human salvation—necessary, but highly imperfect.63 Its imperfection lies not 
only in the lack of justice, but also in the lack of a true feeling of unity among its 
inhabitants. In chapter 19.7 Augustine alludes to Cicero’s idea (expressed at Fin. 
3.62–64) of a plural identity of men who are part of familiar and urban societies 
as well as of the common citizenship of the world. Accordingly, Augustine speaks 
of three steps of human societies (“gradus societatis humanae”): domus, urbs and 
orbis. The larger the entity becomes, the more dangers arise, which arguably 
threaten even Augustine’s ‘weaker’ definition of a state as a gathering of people 
united by common interests: 
post civitatem vel urbem sequitur orbis terrae, in quo tertium gradum ponunt socie-
tatis humanae, incipientes a domo atque inde ad urbem, deinde ad orbem pro-
grediendo venientes; qui utique, sicut aquarum congeries, quanto maior est, tanto 
periculis plenior. in quo primum linguarum diversitas hominem alienat ab homine. … 
quando enim quae sentiunt inter se communicare non possunt propter solam diversi-
tatem linguae, nihil prodest ad consociandos homines tanta similitudo naturae, ita ut 
libentius homo sit cum cane suo quam cum homine alieno. at enim opera data est, ut 
imperiosa civitas non solum iugum, verum etiam linguam suam domitis gentibus per 
pacem societatis inponeret, per quam non deesset, immo et abundaret etiam interpre-
tum copia. verum est; sed hoc quam multis et quam grandibus bellis, quanta strage 
hominum, quanta effusione humani sanguinis comparatum est?64 
The Roman state as the present representative of the civitas terrena suffers from 
the lack of unity among its citizens: as they do not speak the same native language 
and therefore do not understand each other, they do not feel close to each other 
(the sneer that they prefer to live with their own dogs rather than with people 
from other regions undermines another core element of the definitions offered so 
far, that is, a state as based on shared rationality that only human beings possess). 
Only a huge effort of suppression and violence can force the subdued to accept 
 
62 See Smolak, “Res publica res populi Dei,” 125–27; on Rome as the Babylonia secunda, see also van Oort, 
Jerusalem and Babylon, 119. 
63 See Neschke, “La cité n’est pas à nous,” 243: “[S]ur le registre thétique ou catéchisant, il affirme que la 
cité temporelle occupe une place déterminée et tout-à-fait instrumentale dans l’ordre de ce monde … Dans 
le registre apologétique et polémique, Augustin souligne qu’il faut rejeter la prétention de la cité païenne 
existante, Rome, de procurer le salut à ses habitants.”  
64 Augustine, De civitate dei 19.7: “After the state or city comes the world, to which they assign the third 
level of human society; they begin with the household, then progressively arrive at the city, and then at 
the world. And this, like a confluence of waters, is the fuller of dangers as it is the larger. In the first place, 
the diversity of languages separates one man from another. … For where they cannot communicate their 
views to one another, merely because they speak different languages, so little good does it do them to be 
alike by endowment of nature, so far as social unity is concerned, that a man would rather have his dog 
for company than a foreigner. But the imperial city has taken pains to impose on conquered peoples, as a 
bond of peace, not only her yoke but her language, so that there has been far from a lack, but rather a 
superfluity, of interpreters. True; but at what a cost has this unity been achieved, all those great wars, all 
that human slaughter and bloodshed!” (Translation: W.C. Greene, Loeb Classical Library 416, Cambridge, 
MA: Loeb, 1960). Note how this passage obliterates Sallust’s vision of Rome’s uniting capacity (see n. 6 
above) 




the shared Roman language as a minimal base of civic union. By contrast, God’s 
civitas caelestis will generously provide this union in that all inhabitants share the 
same (Christian) faith, and as a consequence the same ethical beliefs. 
We have seen that Augustine, apart from using Cicero explicitly as a source 
and framework for his historical and political reflections,65 also inherited Cicero’s 
interpretatio Romana of the Stoic concept of the cosmopolitan state. But he goes 
one decisive step further: he defines two common and all-encompassing states. 
The imperium Romanum is the earthly civitas mundi, but it is a defective and even 
illegal state. It therefore does not invite associations with ethical cosmopolitanism, 
but with submission under an imperialistic power. God’s state, on the other hand, 
is perfectly just and therefore highly ethical. Ethical goodness is an aspect that is 
discussed in modern sociological approaches of cosmocitizenship.66 But is the ci-
vitas dei therefore cosmopolitan in our modern sense? In some ways it is: it admits 
people from all kinds of ethnicities, regions and social strata. But if one sees cos-
mopolitanism as a project for recognizing multiple identities, including religious 
ones, it hardly qualifies for cosmopolitanism, as Christian faith is the passport one 
needs to become a true citizen. 
4 Lorenzo Valla’s ‘res publica Romanae linguae’ 
For this last part, I make a huge step forwards in time, from the fifth to the 
fifteenth century. Lorenzo Valla’s preface to the Elegantia lingue latine, his major 
work on Latin grammar and style, revives the connection between Roman impe-
rialistic discourse and ideas of cosmopolitanism by moving it from an ethico-po-
litical or religious to a linguistic level.67 The text was written around 1441 when 
the author was in service of King Alfonso of Naples;68 it was also the time when 
the papal curia took the first steps to restore the physical city of Rome to its 
ancient glory (the so-called restauratio Urbis which would continue for the rest of 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). In Valla’s time, however, the ancient mon-
uments were mostly still in a disastrous state. The need to preserve the ancient 
heritage was urgently felt; and the renewed interest in the physical city of Rome 
also made it an important theme in the literature of the time.69 It is important to 
realize this background to appreciate Valla’s treatise fully. As well, he is interested 
in preserving Rome’s ancient Empire, yet he transposed the debate onto a non-
material level. Valla starts from the assessment that the Empire of antiquity has 
obviously been destroyed as a political entity; yet, so he claims, its heritage is not 
completely gone, for it lives on through the Latin language, which is still one of 
the most important media for transnational communication. But, as the physical 
remains of ancient Rome are in danger of disappearing completely and have to be 
rescued, so also the language of ancient Rome needs the united effort of the 
 
65 On Augustine’s Ciceronian method, see O’Daly, “Thinking through History”. 
66 See, for example, Vernon, “Cosmocitizens?” 317: “[S]hould the cosmopolitan be a good citizen?” 
67 Part 4 of my article develops aspects of my earlier interpretation of Valla’s focus on Rome in “Laurentius 
Valla, Romanus, orator,” 152–67. 
68 See Regoliosi, Nel cantiere del Valla, 60–61. 
69 On this aspect, see the forthcoming study by de Beer, The Renaissance Battle for Rome.  




humanists in order to survive. Valla invites all educated men to contribute to its 
‘defence’, which for him means the purification of the language from all non-
classical medievalisms.  
In modern times the text has gained the iconic status of a manifesto of hu-
manist learning; it is often seen as the most explicit definition of a res publica 
litteraria, a republic of letters that is open to anyone who subscribes to the ideals 
of humanistic education, no matter what nationality (s)he has. From this idealistic 
standpoint that still sees humanism as a mostly intellectual movement, the res 
publica litteraria would classify very nicely for a cosmopolitan ‘state’, an intellectual 
world citizenship based on shared cultural values, in this case the love for the 
language and culture of Antiquity.70 More recently, however, interpreters have 
rooted Valla’s claim in the national Italian or even local Roman discourse of his 
time (Valla was a native Roman) and have thus questioned the idealism of the 
text. According to such an interpretation, Valla’s linguistic programme is con-
nected to the debate on which city could claim to be the true heir of ancient 
Rome: contemporary Rome itself (especially because of the papal Curia), or a city 
like Florence, which had been a driving force of humanist learning in the early 
fifteenth century.71 Valla’s close association of the Roman language with the Ro-
man Empire (which in Antiquity always had its heart in the city of Rome) could 
become useful as one argument in favour of Rome as the intellectual centre of the 
humanist movement. 
The preface to the first book in particular is quoted regularly for the famous 
claim that the imperium Romanum can be vindicated solely through the excellence 
of the Latin language. The preface is built on a huge comparison of the Roman 
Empire and its language.72 Valla contrasts the loss of Rome’s political hegemony 
in the world with the triumph of its language, which constitutes the basis for 
what could be called a cosmopolitan state of the intellect in that it encompasses 
in principle the whole known world. In contrast to Augustine, who had high-
lighted the Eastern empires as predecessors of the Roman imperium, Valla marks 
the difference between them: only the Roman Empire has also spread its language 
all over the world73 and thereby turned language into a constituting aspect of 
imperialism. As long as the inhabitants of other countries still speak Latin, the 
nucleus of the Roman Empire has not ceased to exist—its language is explicitly 
called a ruler of the world: “nostra est Italia, nostra Gallia, nostra Hispania, Ger-
mania, Pannonia, Dalmatia, Illyricum multaeque aliae nationes. Ibi namque 
Romanum imperium est ubicumque Romana lingua dominatur.”74 The quotation 
exemplifies that for Valla Empire and language are two sides of the same coin, and 
 
70 See, for example, La Penna, “La tradizione classica nella cultura italiana,” 1319–72; Hanna-Barbara Gerl, 
Rhetorik als Philosophie, especially 248.  
71 Gaeta, “Sull’idea di Roma,” 181; Mazzocco, Linguistic Theories in Dante and the Humanists, 69–81. 
72 See Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 19: “Ac, ne pluribus agam, de comparatione imperii 
sermonisque romani hoc satis est dixisse” (“But in order not to make my argument too lengthy, I have 
spoken enough about the comparison of the Roman Empire and language”). All translations from Valla’s 
preface are my own. The Latin text is taken from Regoliosi, Nel cantiere del Valla, 120–25. 
73 See Johnson, “The Linguistic Imperialism,” 33. 
74 Ibid. 23: “Italy belongs to us, as does France, Spain, Germany, Hungary, the Balkan (Dalmatia and Illyri-
cum), and many other nations. For the Roman Empire exists wherever the Roman language rules.”  




indeed he constantly switches between both.75 It is worth noting that as a Roman 
patriot76 he markedly labels Latin as the lingua Romana; he defends this choice 
by asserting that the more common alternative term, lingua Latina, is ultimately 
related to the city of Rome as well (“[lingua Romana] que eadem Latina a Latio 
ubi Roma est”).77 Generally, we recognize a method that Augustine and Cicero had 
applied as well, namely to connect an apolitical, all-encompassing ideal closely 
with the political entity of the boundless imperium Romanum.78  
More specifically, Valla looks back to Augustine when he uses the Roman 
Empire both as a metaphor (or rather analogy)79 for the global proliferation of his 
alleged linguistic empire and as a negative foil that helps him ex negativo to ag-
grandize the authority of the Latin language. The political Empire is proven to 
have been defective (as also Augustine had presented it) and therefore has ended, 
whereas the idealized alternative (the civitas dei in Augustine, the lingua Romana 
in Valla) is perfect and therefore non-terminated. Another parallel between the 
two authors is the stress on the amount of bloodshed and suppression that was 
needed to enable and control political unity, whereas the alternative is based on 
love and concord instead: “neque enim armis aut cruore aut bellis dominatum 
adeptus est, sed beneficiis amore concordia.”80 Valla’s encomium of the exception-
ality of Latin goes so far that he recurs to words that link his linguistic discourse 
to a quasi-religious sphere: “magnum igitur latini sermonis sacramentum est! mag-
num profecto numen! qui apud peregrinos, apud barbaros, apud hostes sancta et 
religiose per tot secula custoditur ut non tam dolendum nobis Romanis quam gau-
dendum sit atque ipso etiam orbe exaudiente gloriandum.”81 While the holy 
 
75 See De Caprio, “La rinascita della cultura di Roma,” 170. 
76 On Valla’s patriotism, see Fisher, “The Project of Humanism,” 303. 
77 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 4: “… the Roman language, which is the same as the 
Latin, called ‘Latin’ from Latium where Rome is situated.” See Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, 278: 
“For the Roman Valla, it was in Rome that Latin had developed and from whence it had spread.” See also 
di Napoli, Lorenzo Valla, 328: “la romanitas è per lui [that is, Valla, CP] una plena humanitas, quasi para-
digmatica di fronte alla barbarie della non romanità.” 
78 The apparatus fontium by Regoliosi, Nel cantiere del Valla, does not mention Augustine for the preface, 
but links it mostly to Ciceronian and Quintilian concepts of the greatness of the Latin language, but see 
Fisher, “The Project of Humanism,” 316–17 on Christian (Pauline) associations of his imperial metaphor 
(without reference to Augustine, though). 
79 Fisher, “The Project of Humanism,” 303 doubts that one should call this a metaphor because Latin was 
used for actual colonization in the past; but Valla’s focus is less on actual colonization than on the essence 
of the political vs. the linguistic Empire; see also Johnson, “The Linguistic Imperialism,” 32–38, for the 
complexity of Valla’s metaphor (which according to Johnson is meant to contrast the transcendent Rome 
of the Latin language and the political Empire). 
80 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 15: “And the dominion has not been achieved by weap-
ons, blood, or war, but by benefactions, love, and concord.” See the concors concordia in Augustine, De 
civitate dei 19.24 (quoted above) and the reference to blood and war in 19.7: “sed hoc quam multis et quam 
grandibus bellis, quanta strage hominum, quanta effusione humani sanguinis comparatum est?” (quoted 
in its context above). 
81 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 21: “Great is the mystery of the Latin language! Great 
indeed is its divinity! It has been protected by foreigners, barbarians and enemies for so many centuries 
that we Romans must not bemoan but rejoice and be proud while the whole world itself is listening.” 
Regoliosi, Nel cantiere del Valla, ad loc., refers to Paul, Letter to the Ephesians 5:32 and First Letter to 
Timotheus 3:16; for magnum numen one can also think of Cicero, Philippics 3.32: “magna vis est, magnum 




language might refer back to Augustine, too, it is of course also rooted in the 
humanistic presence, in which Rome is closely connected to the papal Curia (see 
below). 
The assertion that even barbarians (etymologically those who speak a foreign 
language) and political enemies (those who fight against Rome’s dominion) em-
brace the holiness of the Latin language, is a truly cosmopolitan claim. The in-
clusive character of his praise is enforced at the end of the quote, where Valla calls 
the whole orbis terrarum as witness for his claim (“ipso etiam orbe exaudiente”). 
Love of Latin is the tie that unites all inhabitants of the globe. Yet, as in the 
preface, there is also ambiguity in this quote. The self-presentation as ‘we Romans’ 
(“nobis Romanis”) thwarts the inclusive rhetoric and roots the claim of the do-
minion of Latin in traditional imperial discourse: ‘we’ (the ingroup) bring ‘our’ 
benefits to ‘them’ (the ‘others’) and ‘we’ can be proud of this ‘civilizing’ act. More-
over, the described unity of all men in the world is only an ideal, and Valla is 
honest enough to acknowledge that the ingroup of the ‘linguistic Romans’ stands 
against an outgroup of linguistic opponents. These are people who do not share 
Valla’s love and engagement for Latin. His rhetorical weapon against those oppo-
nents is radical: they are excluded from the group of rational people and are stig-
matized as new barbarians. 
The consequence is that Valla, who had previously stressed that the spreading 
of Latin was an act of benefaction and love, now turns to military metaphors. The 
grammatical restoration he aspires to is presented as a war against barbarism, and 
Valla sees himself as its military leader: he compares himself to Camillus who had 
driven the Gauls out of Rome in 390 BCE.82 Where does this leave cosmopolitan 
ideas? Again things are ambiguous. On the one hand, membership of the ingroup 
of Valla’s reform, or (put differently) citizenship of the res publica litteraria, is 
explicitly not confined to national boundaries. In order to stress this, Valla rede-
fines the word ‘Quirites’, Roman citizens, in a radical way: “quousque tandem, 
Quirites, (litteratos appello et Romane lingue cultores, qui et veri et soli Quirites 
sunt, ceteri enim potius inquilini) quousque, inquam, Quirites urbem nostram, 
non dico domicilium imperii, sed parentem litterarum, a Gallis captam esse patie-
mini, id est latinitatem a barbaria oppressam?”83 On the other hand, the passage 
is dense with historical symbolism—as mentioned above, in the rest of the preface 
Valla elaborates the idea of fighting against the Gauls in order to protect Rome—
and plays with the dichotomy of supra-nationality versus Rome-centeredness. All 
people from the whole world are invited, yet those who accept the invitation will 
become the new Roman citizens in that they defend the Roman language, the 
 
numen unum et idem sentientis senatus,” where it refers to unanimity between opponents, as well (in this 
case the senators during the civic struggle after Caesar’s death). 
82 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 39–41: “Camillus vobis, Camillus imitandus est ... equi-
dem, quod ad me attinet, hunc imitabor, hoc mihi proponam exemplum.” (“Camillus—you must imitate 
Camillus … As far as I am concerned, I will imitate him and chose him as my example.”) 
83 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum 23: “How long, citizens (for this is how I call the intel-
lectuals and conservators of the Roman language who are the true and only Quirites, the others being 
immigrants), how long, citizens, will you tolerate that our city, I do not say the dwelling of the empire, 
but the parent of learnedness, is captured by the Gauls, that is, Latinity suppressed by barbarism?” 




symbol of Rome’s everlasting imperium. Cosmopolitanism means Romanization 
at a very basic level. 
But which Rome and which empire is Valla referring to? Is he dreaming of 
turning the tide and does he believe that his linguistic reform can ultimately res-
urrect a kind of political Roman Empire again?84 Or is he merely speaking as a 
humanist and grammarian whose interest is in language, not in politics? At the 
end, an answer depends on how strongly the Roman metaphor will resonate in 
any reader’s mind and, as a consequence, how strongly it will define the actual city 
of Rome as the necessary centre of European humanism.85 Valla always keeps both 
interpretations alive: a national Roman and a transnational cosmopolitan commu-
nity, as the following quotation once more demonstrates: “confido propediem 
linguam romanam vere plus quam urbem, et cum ea disciplinas omnes, iri resti-
tutum. Quare pro mea in patriam pietate, immo adeo in omnes homines, et pro 
rei magnitudine cunctos facundie studiosos ex superiore loco libet adhortari.”86 
Valla connects his linguistic program with the beginning of restauratio Urbis under 
the popes Eugene IV and Nicolas V, yet at the same time relativizes the physical 
renewal of Rome by asserting that his linguistic reform is more valuable (plus 
quam). He is driven by love for Rome (his patria), but even more for all men (that 
is, all inhabitants of the world, the compatriots of the newly formed res publica 
litteraria). The dreamt-of papal (religious and political) Empire and the references 
to defending the Roman state are both real, in that they are situated in Valla’s 
historical context, and metaphorical at the same time, in that they stress the ur-
gency and extent of his cultural, cosmopolitan endeavour. 
The ambiguity with which Valla refers to the imperium Romanum has reper-
cussions on whether we could label his humanist Republic of letters a cosmopol-
itan state. Similar in certain ways to Augustine’s civitas dei, his imperium linguae 
is cosmopolitan because it disrespects physical borders and is open to all. Yet sim-
ilarly to Cicero’s cosmopolitan city, it is oriented towards the actual city of 
Rome.87 Moreover, even if it is interpreted idealistically as a manifesto for a res 
 
84 Fisher, “The Project of Humanism,” 305–6 partly suggests this, when he speaks of the ideal and factual 
(present) Empire, and p. 309 on humanism as “colonial enterprise”; on pp. 314–15, however, he proposes 
a more philosophical interpretation (the political metaphor stands for “the capacity to receive the fullness 
of the primary truths”), and on pp. 316–17 a Christian one (see above n. 74). As his is a “poetic” reading 
of the metaphors (“the rhetorical surfaces”) of the text, he advocates semantic ambiguity (see p. 322). 
85 On the (also emotional) intensity of the manifold imagery of Rome in Valla’s preface (“Rome as empire, 
Rome as fallen and yet somehow persisting commonwealth, and this new and spiritual Rome as a republic 
to be restored and defended”), see Johnson, “The Linguistic Imperialism,” 36–37. 
86 Valla, De elegantia lingue latine proemium primum, 33–34: “I am confident that very soon the Roman 
language will be restored more than the city, and with it all other sciences. Therefore according to my 
duty and respect towards my fatherland, nay rather towards all people, and according to the greatness of 
the matter I am disposed to encourage all experts of eloquence from the highest range.” 
87 The Roman connection of Valla’s linguistic reforms will become stronger with the years. In 1455, when 
in the meantime he had moved to Rome, Valla delivered a speech for the opening of the Academic Year 
of Rome’s studium Urbis: Valla, Oratio in principio studii die XVIII Octobris MCCCCLV, in Valla, Orazione 
per l’inaugurazione, 192–216. In this speech he recurred to many of the arguments he had voiced in the 
preface of the Elegantia. The most obvious innovation, however, is the role of the papal Curia that guar-
antees the persistence of the ancient Roman traditions (§34). See Bianca, “La curia,” 97–113, on the Curia 
as domicilium sapientiae, and Pieper, Elegos redolere, 223–26 for a more detailed discussion of Valla’s Ora-
zione as opposed to the Elegantia. 




publica litteraria, the preface invokes a state which is not fully cosmopolitan in 
that not everyone can be member of it (see the clear distinction between cives and 
inquilini in the passage quoted above)—learnedness and the belief in the holiness 
of the Roman/Latin language is the passport one needs to show, as Christian faith 
had been for Augustine.  
5 Conclusion 
The three case studies of this article have shown the diversity of cosmopolitan 
discourse in Latin literature. Starting from Cicero’s reception and Roman inter-
pretation of Greek Stoic ideas of a world citizenship, they move towards Christian 
philosophy and theology in Augustine and towards cultural imperialism in Valla. 
Only in Cicero’s case is the link to Stoic thought made explicit, whereas the two 
other authors react in a looser way to the philosophical discourse. Nonetheless, 
they all pose an important question: what is the relation between the philosoph-
ical/theological/linguistic ideal and the historical realities? More concretely, the 
question that has interested me is: what is the role of the Roman Empire within 
the three case studies, a political entity that once had conquered large parts of the 
then known world? Two answers that unite the three cases emerge: first, the 
Roman Empire is used as a representative and/or contrastive foil of an idealized 
cosmopolitan world. Second, all three authors doubt that the Roman Empire may 
truly be classified as a cosmopolitan state. Cicero and Augustine question its legal 
or moral fundament, whereas Valla sees the ancient Empire already as a past entity 
that has proven to be vulnerable, and which has finally been conquered and de-
stroyed. Whether the papal Curia will be able to fill the gap, is very much a ques-
tion that kept Valla, and with him many humanists of his generation, busy. 
The question remains, then, whether the ideal alternatives offered by Cicero, 
Augustine and Valla can at least be classified as a cosmopolitan state. An answer 
depends on which criteria for cosmopolitanism we apply. From an ancient per-
spective, they all would, as they are based on justice, equality of men and voluntary 
submission under a dominion. From a modern perspective, however, they are all 
deficient in that they entail dichotomies of in- and outgroups and define a legal, 
theologian or linguistic Leitkultur that all citizens of the community have to em-
brace. As in modern theoretical approaches the ability and willingness to live with 
the ‘Other’ and a critical attitude towards dogmatism are defined as crucial ele-
ments of cosmopolitanism,88 most Latin texts dealing with it will not entirely 
fulfil these criteria. Rather, they can sensitize us to the vicinity of cosmopolitan 
and imperial discourses. The ancient and humanistic texts show that cosmopolitan 
ideas often arise in times of strong imperialistic claims; they serve as alternatives 
to a seemingly uncontested world order of dominion, submission and egoism. 
Alternatives are not automatically perfect, perhaps not even better than the con-
cepts they criticize—but they always open up discursive fields and trigger new 
reflection about the status quo. In this sense, the history of Latin 
 
88 See Stevenson, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship” (quoted above with n. 2). 




cosmopolitanism has much to offer for modern readers to make sense of the world 
in which we live. 
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